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Ato Sekyi-Otu’s newest book is equal parts refreshing and provocative. I have chosen
to focus on the broad political application of Sekyi-Otu’s defence of universalist ethics
as it appears in the third chapter, “Ethical Communism and African Thought.” For
what is, to my mind, most refreshing and heretical in this text – all the more because
I write from the USA – is its devotion to communism as the position that necessarily
follows from a commitment to a robust ethical universalism. This argument is natural
enough because, as the title of the chapter indicates, communism is not a mode of
production, a political system, or a practical organization of society: it is fundamen-
tally and timelessly an “ethical enterprise” (90). In this way, Sekyi-Otu contributes to
the “revival” of communism that has been underway since 2008, working explicitly
against the popular idea that communism died as a viable political horizon with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and implicitly against the equally popular notion that
the history of communism in the 20th century reveals that it was not a viable political
horizon in the first place. We can take these two ideologemes as responses to the
questions of communism’s possibility and its desirability, respectively. They are the
rhetorical ground that a defence of communism must take, and what distinguishes
Sekyi-Otu’s argument from others in the same vein is that he claims that communism
has always been possible because it has always been desirable, and that our failure to
create an egalitarian society so far should be attributed to a failure of the will rather
than to the movement of historical circumstances.
The labour of the argument is equal parts negative and positive. On the one hand,
the thrust of Sekyi-Otu’s definition is to be radically inclusive such that egalitarian
struggles throughout human history are equally contributors to the communist pro-
ject; on the other hand, it is also necessary to distinguish this notion of communism
from the weight of its own narrow history. The productive tensions in this chapter
and in this book lie within this pull between the positive and the negative, the univer-
sal and the particular.
The most important polemical goal in the chapter has to do with the “enabling
conditions” of communism, which, Sekyi-Otu argues, are primarily “conscious
choices, decisions, [and] purposes,” and not “unwilled and determining causes” (106).
There are two “unwilled and determining causes” of communism that he is most
eager to distinguish himself from: capitalism and abundance. In concrete terms, this
entails a critique of the programmatist notion of communist development that
obtained in Europe in the 20th century, which can be summarized as the belief that
the development of capitalism would necessarily swell the ranks of the industrial
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proletariat as increasing demand for labour in these sectors was met by workers
expelled from a declining peasantry. Because the dense and cooperative conditions
under which industrial labourers worked enabled for the first time a robust class con-
sciousness, all that was necessary was to wait until such workers constituted a major-
ity of the enfranchised population, at which point the capitalist economy could be
dismantled by the very liberal democratic institutions it had brought into being. On
more abstract terrain, it also entails the rejection of the fairly schematic Euromarxist
position that capitalism develops the forces of production to the point that capitalist
social relations become a burden, and communist social relations are finally instituted
now that they have the abundance that is their precondition. That these things failed
to happen, and continue to fail to happen, is the riddle that any new communist pro-
ject most solve, and what is intolerable about this narrative for Sekyi-Otu is not so
much that it is incorrect – although even on its own terrain it is – but rather that it
is ethically vacuous and that it downplays quite heavily the possibility of communism
in the global south.
Sekyi-Otu describes quite admirably the difficulties that issued from these positions
for revolutionary leaders in midcentury decolonial struggles (101–103). For even if
you agreed that these societies could be appropriately called capitalist, the history of
colonialism had foreclosed on the possibility of abundance on the scale that the pro-
grammatists imagined would foster communism. In response to the “scientific” belief
that communism would happen naturally emerged the distinct variant of “African
socialism” of Nyerere, Senghor, and Nkrumah, which makes “recourse to antecedent
moral foundations available for retrieval” in contemporary African society (103). The
issue with this ideology for Sekyi-Otu seems to be its delimited historical ground: the
particular form of ethics appealed to is constrained to a particular time and place.
For this reason, he favours by far the ethical vision offered by Ayi Kwei Armah – the
chapter is in fact a very compelling reading of Armah’s provocative oeuvre – for
whom communism is “ethical in a more underlying existential sense,” one based in a
decision that is made rather than found in the past (103). And this is the rub: that
communism requires nothing other than the choice to desire a communitarian over
an individualist society. In the words of Armah:
Any society whose members are intelligent enough to plan the democratic sharing of
power and resources (scar[c]e and abundant) and committed enough to work out
practical methods for implementing such plans, is ready for communism, no matter how
poor that society is. Any society whose members are bent each on maximizing his
private property and minimizing his personal sacrifices is not ready for communism, no
matter how gross its national product may be. (quoted in 106)
I fully agree with Sekyi-Otu and Armah that it is necessary to disarticulate the
value of communism from the abundance that it presupposes and offers. The peculiar
rhetorical difficulties around this word in the USA have led to the overselling of com-
munism as the means of achieving true abundance, over and against the images of
three-block breadlines that the idea tends to conjure thanks to Cold War propaganda.
This undersells by a wide margin the extent to which the abundance already enjoyed
by large segments of the waged working class in the USA is predicated upon the
exploitation of the global south, and the very real fact that if the consumption of the
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entire world rose to the level of the global north, the planet would become uninhabit-
able more quickly than it already is. All of which is to say that the disarticulation of
communism from the promise and precondition of abundance is vital and effective.
I am also wholly convinced by the argument that communism is not the necessary
result of the development of capitalism, and not therefore the reward that falls into
the laps of patient communists who simply wait on contradictions within capitalism
to work themselves out in the fullness of time. I have more trouble with the concomi-
tant argument that communism does not emerge from particular material situations
– that, in other words, communism is not founded on the negation of capitalism. At
the very least I worry about the implications of believing this. Let me explain by way
of thinking through the work that teleology and telos perform in the argument. An
important component of Sekyi-Otu’s reasoning is the familiar anti-communist criti-
cism that scientific and programmatic socialism depends upon the belief that com-
munism is the “teleological consummation of history” (100). The phrase is meant to
summon up all manner of Hegelian baggage in order to unite the belief that human
history is at all points striving to realize the concept of communism, and in the pro-
cess of doing so must work through a sequence of stages. In this narrative, belief in
the historical necessity of communism is indeed yoked securely to the belief that cap-
italism is the necessary precondition of communism. But are these two claims neces-
sarily intertwined? If one agrees, as most of us would, that history is not externally
mediated by the idea of communism, does this necessarily liberate the possibility of
communism from a strictly capitalist horizon?
To say that history is teleological is to say that it is striving to realize the parame-
ters of a given concept. Consider this passage from Armah that serves as the epigraph
to the chapter: “A social system chooses whether to reinforce individualist or socialist
psychology…” (89). If we take this seriously – and this is the necessary result of
Sekyi-Otu’s ethical foundationalism – what he have is a society that is teleological at
every point insofar as it is the result of a choice. Because there is no sense in which
an individualist society necessarily entails the development of communist desire, or
vice-versa, this does indeed dismantle the possibility of a teleological history, but at
the cost of suffusing every moment in the history of human society with its own telos.
I do not believe that Sekyi-Otu would disagree with this paraphrase of his argument,
nor would he disagree with the claim itself: all of this is entailed in his definitional
claim that communism “has as its aim the realization of an ideal, that of egalitarian
justice” (106). The distinction I am drawing here seems to be what he has in mind
when he contrasts communism’s untenable “teleological warrant” with a more salu-
brious “teleopoesis,” by which he means the “unending activity of fashioning and
attending to ends” by way of education (118). The argument, put simply, is that
human society is always subordinate to human desire, and that those desires do not
change as society changes: they are or can be present at any point, and there is no
way to predict what desires will be found in a given place.
As is often the case with arguments that strive for this kind of historical breadth,
the price paid for that scope is abstraction. Given the empirical breadth of social and
economic arrangements throughout human history – to say nothing of all of those
that have only been imagined – the degree of abstraction required to make them all
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answer to two categories is substantial, which is why communism is displaced from a
concrete state of affairs to the “extended family of visions of egalitarian justice that peo-
ple all spaces of human experience in time” (112). Concomitant with this is the dis-
placement of communism from an object of desire to the desire for some other object:
one no longer wishes for communism, exactly, but rather communism is the name of
the wish for egalitarian justice, communitarian society, or some other object that is
equally abstract. I do not doubt that one can find a desire for egalitarian justice
throughout human history. What I am less convinced of is the utility of identifying
this with communism, particularly for egalitarian struggles happening right now. For if
that historically universal desire corresponds to things so heterogeneous that a “family
name” is required to yoke them together, this is because the concrete details are so dis-
parate as to be incommensurable with each other: both the mechanisms by which
abundance and scarcity will be made and shared and the impediments to those mecha-
nisms have taken a variety of different forms throughout history, and the possibilities
and problems that we face today are unique in their particulars. These technical details
are not extraneous to the desire for communism but the very fabric of it.
And so, while I can see the rhetorical utility of absorbing the energy of all egalitar-
ian desire into the ambit of communism, and I fully agree with the vigorous critique
of the first-world chauvinism that often informs the belief that a given society is “not
ready” for communism, I nevertheless think that right now every society is ready for
communism, that the survival of the human race depends on communism, and that
communism will require nothing less than the negation of capitalist social relations.
It is not preordained: a necessary precondition is that enough people desire it, and
that is no sure thing. While necessary, the presence of communist desire is not suffi-
cient, and if that desire is only for something as abstract as “equality” in a world that
is abstractly founded on the equality of buyer and seller, it will not take us very far.
The kernel of “scientific socialism” lies not in its belief in the inevitability of com-
munism and the abdication of desire as a necessary factor in its realization. It is
rather that the realization of the communist idea requires a concrete understanding
of the problems to be solved and the state of affairs to be instantiated. Sekyi-Otu is
absolutely correct that to be a communist is to act as a communist, but I nevertheless
feel that what it means to act as a communist today is the most important problem
to be solved. The answer does not lie in the past or outside of time, but in the world
as we find it today.
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